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Several pressing problems in modern society result from too many
people acting in their private interest rather than in the common
interest. Topical examples of the undesired consequences of self-
interested behavior are over-production, traffic congestion, and
environmental pollution. The benefits of maximizing one's production
rates, travelling by private car, and dumping toxic waste products accrue
to the individual actor, while the costs of such behavior (price declines,
time delays in travelling, and environmental deterioration) are spread out
over the whole society. Such arrangements of costs and benefits confront
goups of interdependent people with a so called social dilemma (Dawes,
1980): for any individual it may be more profitable to act in one's private
interest than in the common interest; however, all individuals are worse
off if all act in their private interest rather than in the common interest.
The present dissertation reports five empirical studies on group
members' behavior in experimental social dilemma games. These studies
focus on some of the many social psychological issues that come up from
social dilemmas. In Chapter One the focal issues are introduced.
First, social dilemmas face groups with two related problems: when too
many people act in their private interest, the group falls short in the
achievement of desired common goals (low group efficiencv in realizing
common interests); furthermore, a skew distribution of costs and benefits
will arise: those who exert themselves to serve the common interest
attain lower outcomes than the ones who refrain from contributing to the
common interest (an uufair distribution of outcomes).
The second issue concerns the alternative approaches groups may
follow to avoid these problems. Groups may vÍlÍy the extent to which
their members are free to decide whether or not to contribute to the
common interest: in some situations Soup members' DECISIONAL
FREEDOM is UNRESTRICTED, while in other situations group members'
DECISIONAL FRFEDOM is MORE OR LESS RESTRICTED bv
superordinate regulatory agencies.
These two issues, i.e. the eKent to which group members' decisional
freedom is restricted, and the dual task of promoting group efficiency in
realizing common goals and fairness in the distribution of outcomes,
constitute an analytical framework for the studies reported in the
subsequent chapters. This framework is depicted below.
128





effLcLency dist rLbutLon ofoutcqoes
of outcoDea
noE
resËrlcted Study I Study 2
declgLonal sonewhat





Study 4 Study 3
The first two studies address the question how people deal with social
dile--as under conditions of UNRESTRICTED DECISIONAL FREEDOM;
group members' voluntary contributions to the common interest constitute
the main dependent variable.
Chapter Two reports Study L, which primarily focuses on Êroup
efficiencv. A first aim of Study f. is to assess the achieved level of group
efficiency as a function of the objective interdependence structure. As
predicted on the base of Game Theory, the results show that the common
interest is better served in tbe Trust Dilemma and the Chicken Dilemma
than in the Prisoner's Dilemma. The second and major aim of Study f- is
to test a prediction derived from Social Identity Theory $ajfel & Turner,
L986; Turne4 L987), that the coÍrmon interest will be bettEr served when
the people involved perceive themselves as members of a group sharing a
oommon fate than when they perceive themselves as single individuals.
The results offer strong support for our prediction and sustain a social
identiÍication interpretation.
Chapter Tlree reports Study 2, which primarily focuses on
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oxceptions, research on social dilemmas focuses on symmetric social
dilemmas, in which mutual contributions by the group members yield them
the same outcomes, i.e. the same costs and the same benefits. In real l i fe,
however, group members clften differ from each other as for their relative
costs and relative benefits associated with contributing to the common
interest. Study 2 explores a newly developed asymmetric social dilemma
gamo, in which rve vary a subject's resources and a subject's profit from
tire realization of the common interest. In accordance with our Equity
theoretical prediction, it appears that group members strive for fairness:
the larger a group member's amount of resources and the larger a group
member's profit, the more this group member feels designated to
contribute and the more he or she actually contributes to the common
interest.
Earlier research on social dilemmas (Rutte & Wilke, 1984) suggests that
when group members become dissatisfied with the achieved level of group
efficiency and about the distribution of outcomes, they may choose to
change the decisional structure. A mutual agreement to appoint a leader
who makcs decisions on behalf of ali of them, CONSIDERABLY
RESTRICTS their DECISIONAL FREEDOM. The leader's dual task then,
is to promote group efficie ncy and fairness in the distribution of
outcomes. The next two studies examine regular group members'
endorsement of the leader as a function of the leader's task fulf i lment.
Chapter Four reports Study 3, which assesses regular group members'
responses to the distribution of outcomes by the leader. We vary the
outcomes a leader purportedly allocates to him or herself, to the
subordinate subject, and to a fellow subordinate. As predicted by Equity
Theory (Adams, 19ó5; Messick & Cook, 1983), the results show that an
equal distribution of outcomes among the three persons is considered
most fair and leacls to the most strong leader endorsement. However,
fairness may be driven out by greecl. This appears from the fact that
favorably treated group members respond as if they are equitably treated;
both types of group members provide the leader with stronger
endorse mcnt than the aggrievecl ones. Furthermore, the results show that
being favorably treated in comparison with one other group member is
such a comfortable position that this group member's ieader endorsement
is not affected by outcome differences between him or herself and a third
group membcr.
Study 4, reported in Cltapter Five, assesses regular group members'
responses to a leader's success or failure in promoting group efficiency.
In addition, we vary the predictability of the environment in which the
r30
leader has to take decisions. We expect stronger endorsement of
successful leaders than of failing ones. Furthermore, based on the
Attributional approach of leadership (Calder, 7977; Pfeffer, IgTi) we
expect weaker endorsement of successlul ]eaders in a totally
unpre dictable environment than in a predictable environment, and less
rejection of fail ing leaders in a totally unpredictable than in a predictable
environment. In accordance with our hypotheses, the results show that
successful leaders receive stronger enclorsement than fail ing ones.
Furthermore, a leader's success in promoting group efficiency elicits
weaker leader endorsement in an unpredictable environment than in a
predictable environment. However, contrary to our hypothesis, a Ieader,s
failure elicits similar leader rejection in an unpredictable as in a
predictable environment. Although our hypotheses were only partly
confirmed, additional data sustain the attributional interpretation.
In the final study, which is reported in Chapter Srr, group members,
DECISIONAL FREEDOM is RESTRICTED ONLY TO SOME DEGREE
by supe rimposed sanctions. As such, Study 5 takes an intermediate
position between unrestricted decisional freedom (Study 1 and Study 2)
and leadership (Study 3 and Study 4). For yer another reason rhe final
study occupies an intermediate position in the framework: rather than
focusing on the level of group efficiency (Study 1 and Study 4) or on the
distribution of outcomes (Study 2 ar.d Study 3) exclusively, we now
address their interconnection. We study the level of group efficiency as a
function of the distribution of outcomes: punishments reduce the
outcomes of the non-contributing group members, while rewards raise the
or:tcomes of the contributing ones. study 5 assesses the relative
effectiveness of the mere presentation of punishments and rewards to
promote contributions to the common interest in pay-off equivalent
games. Furthermore, Study 5 compares the responses of samples of
different subject populations to sanctions being supplied by different
regulatory agencies. Employing a simulation game of environmental
pollution by chemical industries, four experiments are conducted: in trvo
experiments students serve as the subjects, and the sanctions are
presented as being supplied either by the government (Experiment 5a) or
by the pare nt company (Expcriment 5d). In the other trvo experiments
members of the Dutch Junior chamber - predominantly industrial managers
and their spouses - serve as the subjects; again the sanctions are
presented as being supplied by the government (Experiment 5b) or by the
parenl company (Experiment 5c).
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yield equivalent levels of group efficiency. In the student population the
mere presentation of punishments and rewards proves equally effective in
promoting group efficiency, regardless of the supplying agency. In
contrast, behavior of the Junior Chamber members is not affected by the
presentation of punishments, and is differentially affected by the
presentation of rewards: whereas rewards supplied by the government
arouse reactance (particularly in the male Junior Chamber members) and
result in low group efficiency, rewards supplied by the parsnt company
effectively promote group efficiency.
In Chapter Seven the results and conclusions of these five studies are
discussed in a somewhat broader perspective. The present research
demonstrates that when group members are left completely free to decide
whether or not to contribute to the common interest there may eKist a
normative consensus that exerting oneself to serve the group interest is
the right thing to do. However, it appears that individual group members
may be tempted to ease up; the stronger the objective or subjectively
perceived conflict between private interests and group iaterests, the lower
their contribution to the group interest. Structural solutions, which more
or less restict group members' decisional freedom, face groups with
higher-order problems, however. The leadership solution is problematic for
at least two reasons. First, successful leadership does not only involve
promoting the level o[ group efficiency, but also reinforcing the desired
process of causal attribution in the constituency. Second, the endorsement
of the leader by favorably treated group members may lead to corruption
of a leader's authority. Solutions which are less restrictive in nature,
such as punishments and rewards, may also yield undesired consequences;
interventions which may have been proven effective within an academic
laboratory setting may even yield counter productive effects when
implemented on other people in other situations. This underlines the
necessity of further research on fundamental social psychological
processes in groups dealing with social dilemmas. Furthermore, it stresses
that it is preferable for social dilemma researchers to explore the extent
to which their findings can be generalized to people and situations
outside the laboratory: an analysis of the strong and weak points of the
experimental gaming approach stimulates hypothesis building and the
develooment of relevant research tasks.
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